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Colonial extractive institutions are often blamed for current African underdevelopment. Yet, 
since colonial extraction is hard to quantify, the magnitude of this phenomenon remains 
unclear. In this paper, I use new archival data to estimate colonial extraction through trade, 
measured as the gap between prices that the monopsonistic French trading companies paid to 
African producers and prices that should have been paid in a counterfactual competitive 
market. The results show that African prices were only a small fraction of competitive prices, 
implying an annual loss of almost 2% of GDP during colonial rule. 
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I  Introduction 
 
Many leading hypotheses about current African underdevelopment emphasize the role of 
colonialism. While early literature has explored how colonial rule relegated Africa to the role of 
exporter of primary commodities (Rodney 1972), more recent works have instead focused on 
the long-term consequences of colonial extractive institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001 and 2002; Englebert 2000; Herbst 2000; Nunn 2007).1  Yet, to explain how 
colonial institutions have affected current development, the extent of extraction during the 
colonial period needs to be further explored. Many of the institutions established by the 
colonizers were, in fact, maintained in the post-independence period. Moreover, the extent to 
which they were extractive in the colonial period affects how extractive they are after 
independence (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Bates 1981).  
However, since colonial extraction is hard to quantify and its exact mechanisms are 
unclear, we still do not know precisely how successful the colonizers were in extracting wealth 
from Africans. While historians have collected information about colonial institutions, they 
have not systematically quantified the level of extraction. In this same vein, economists have 
often overlooked the temporal variation in colonial extraction, increasing the risk of 
“compression of history” and making it difficult to understand how extractive institutions vary 
over time (Austin 2008).2 One of the main reasons for this gap in the literature is that extractive 
institutions were used in all colonies, creating challenges in finding appropriate 
counterfactuals.  
In this paper, I tackle this issue by exploiting the peculiar structure of labor and trade 
policies implemented by the French colonizers. In French Africa, because of the low population 
density and the high cost of labor relative to land, the colonizers faced powerful incentives to 
implement extractive institutions such as labor coercion and trade monopsonies. Thanks to 
these arrangements, colonial trading companies were able to obtain agricultural commodities 
from African producers at very low prices and resell them in Europe for large profits. 3 This 
specific feature of French trade allows us to estimate the magnitude of colonial extraction by 
looking at the difference between the prices that the African producers received and the prices 
that they should have received had the colonizer not implemented trade monopsonies and 
coercive labor institutions. In other words, we can use producer prices in a competitive market 
— calculated as the difference between world market prices and trading costs – as a 




To implement this idea, I first constructed a new yearly dataset of prices at the African 
ports and in France for the main commodities exported from each French colony in Sub-
Saharan Africa between 1898 and 1959. I collected these data from a variety of colonial 
publications, including statistical reports of the Ministry of the Colonies, customs statistics, and 
Bulletins Economiques of the different colonies. To estimate prices at the producer level, I relied 
on the fact that colonial publications reported prices at the African port as the sum of producer 
prices and trade costs between the producer and the port. Thus, by measuring these inland 
trade costs, I was able to estimate producer prices. To evaluate what they should have been in 
a competitive market, I first constructed estimates of trading costs including Atlantic shipping, 
insurance, inland transportation, port charges, and export taxes, by using a variety of historical 
sources. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide systematic estimates 
of trade costs in French Africa. I then computed competitive producer prices by subtracting 
these costs from the prices at the French port. Finally, by comparing actual and competitive 
producer prices, I estimated the level of colonial extraction in export trade. The results show 
that actual producer prices were much lower than what they should have been in a competitive 
market: extraction rates varied by colony, commodity, and over time, and ranged from 20% to 
over 70%. 
The procedure described above relies on correctly taking into account all trading costs. Yet, 
even if we correctly estimate observable trade costs, one could still worry that the measured 
difference between actual and competitive producer prices might be due to other unobservable 
factors. These could include costs related to quality differences, market frictions, mechanisms 
of insurance for producers, compensation for risk and uncertainty in colonial trade, and 
productivity differences. To address these issues, I regressed actual prices on competitive 
prices, while taking into account unobservable costs by using colony, commodity, and year fixed 
effects. This was done to examine the extent to which an increase in the competitive price was 
reflected in an increase in the producer price or in an increase in the profit of the colonizer. As 
an additional approach to control for unobservable factors, I also used instrumental variables 
by instrumenting the competitive producer price with world market price. The key identifying 
assumption is that, since French trade from Africa accounted for only a very small part of world 
trade, world prices are uncorrelated with unobservable trade costs within the French colonies. 
The results from both regression approaches show that, even after taking into account 
unobservable factors, the difference between actual and competitive producer prices remains 




Together, the evidence suggests that prices to African producers were much lower than 
competitive prices and that this difference cannot be explained by observable or unobservable 
trade costs. On average, prices to African producers were about half of what they would have 
been in the absence of monopsonies and coercive institutions.4 To interpret these estimates, it 
is important to recognize the counterfactual examined. Instead of comparing African prices to 
what they would have been without colonization, I compared to them to what they would have 
been had colonizers implemented non-extractive institutions. The results of the present paper 
do not dismiss the fact that Africans might have benefited from the increased access to 
international markets brought by colonization; rather, they underline that it was the colonizers 
(and not the colonies) who captured most of these benefits.  The average annual loss due to 
monopsonistic colonial trade was equivalent to almost 2% of GDP of West and Equatorial 
French Africa. It is hard to tell how the colonies would have developed without colonization 
extraction, but adding an additional 2% of annual GDP growth to the average 1% growth that 
these colonies experienced between 1900 and 1950 would mean more than doubling their per 
capita GDP at the eve of independence. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After a short summary of the relevant 
literature, section II presents the data. Section III discusses the methodology used to quantify 
colonial extraction. Section IV provides and interprets the price-gap estimates. Section V 
presents robustness checks and outlines the methodology to account for unobservable costs. 
Section VI offers concluding remarks and delineates directions of future research. 
 
Related Literature  
 
Looking at the difference between actual and competitive producer prices is one possible 
approach to measure colonial extraction. Alternative methodologies include considering the 
colony’s balance of payment, comparing taxes and expenditures, or focusing on inequality.  
By looking at the balance of payments, one could measure the net income that is 
transferred from the colony to the colonizing country in terms of import/exports and cash 
transfers. For example, Manning (1982) argued that in 1910 only 40% of Dahomey government 
revenue was spent in the colony, while the rest was sent to Dakar and Paris. Roberts (1976) 
reported that between1930 and 1940, “Britain had kept for itself 2,400,000 pounds in taxes 
from the Copper-belt, while Northern Rhodesia received from Britain only 136,000 pounds in 




 The level of taxation can also be taken as a measure of extraction. For instance, to describe 
the extractive character of the colonial state, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) cited 
Young (1994), who found that tax rates in Tunisia were four times larger than in France, and 
Peemans (1975), who demonstrated that African tax rates in Congo reached almost 60%. In 
addition to the absolute level of taxation, it is also important to examine tax revenue 
expenditure. Frankema (2011) analyzed public finances in the British African colonies and 
constructed a measure of the extractive character of the State based on ”the ratio of investments 
in ‘human resources’—  i.e. education and health care, versus the costs of establishing and 
maintaining ’colonial order’ represented by the expenses on administration, domestic security 
and the military.” Similarly, Huillery (2014) found that transfers from France accounted for 
only 2% of the revenue of French West Africa, and that most of it was spent for administration 
and the army. Furthermore, Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson (2011) presented a different 
approach to measure extraction. In their work, they introduced the concept of inequality 
extraction ratio, defined as the ratio between the actual level of inequality in a society and the 
maximum feasible level of inequality, considering that everyone needs to have a subsistence 
income. 
The aforementioned methodologies are based on a macro approach, focusing on the state’s 
public finance or the overall level of inequality in the society. In contrast, the methodology used 
in this paper applies a more micro-oriented approach to estimate colonial extraction by 
focusing on a specific type of extractive institution: colonial trade policies. Nevertheless, all 
these methodologies are complementary. “Colonial extractive institutions” is a general term 
that includes many institutional arrangements ranging from trade policies, land and labor 
systems, and public finance. Thus, different approaches to measure colonial extraction shed 
light on different aspects of colonial rule and create a clearer understanding of extractive 




Although both economists and historians agree on the importance of trade monopsonies and 
labor coercion during the French colonization of Africa, to date the extent of colonial extraction 
has been difficult to assess. In order to evaluate the magnitude of this phenomenon, it is 
imperative to identify a proper counterfactual. Since in a competitive market, without 
monopsonies and coercive labor markets, the prices to African producers should be equal to 




colonial extraction by analyzing whether prices to African producers in the French colonies 
were lower than these counterfactual competitive prices.  
Ideally, we would like to observe prices at the producer level. However, the remaining 
records report only sparse information for some colonies/commodities and years. Therefore, 
it is not possible to use them in order to provide a general assessment of colonial extraction. 
Instead, what available records report is information on prices at the African and French ports 
and on trade costs, which I will describe in the following sub-sections. 
 
Prices in Africa 
 
I collected price data for four main agricultural commodities exported from French Africa 
between 1898 and 1959: peanuts (shelled and unshelled), palm kernels, ginned cotton, and 
cocoa beans. I included only commodities that were produced by African farmers. This is 
because, in the case of commodities produced under European plantations, the port price 
included also the profit of the concessionary company and it would not be a good measure of 
colonial extraction. Overall, the commodities in the dataset account for about two-thirds of the 
value of all exports from West and Equatorial French Africa during the entire colonial period. 
Colonial customs statistics reported the total quantity and value of commodities exported 
from each colony every year. These statistics were registered at local customs offices and then 
aggregated at the colony level. The reported values were measured at the exit port and included 
the price paid to African producers together with processing, inland transport, warehousing 
and port costs, and in some cases customs duties.  The sources used to gather these data include 
numerous yearly issues of different colonial publications, statistical reports of the Ministry of 
Colonies, Bulletins Economiques of the various colonies, and Annuaire Statistiques of West and 
Equatorial Africa. Online Appendix C provide more information on the specific sources. 
 
Prices in France 
 
I collected prices in France from various issues of the Statistiques Mensuelles du Commerce 
Extérieur de la France, a monthly publication by the Direction Générale des Douanes reporting 
the total values and quantities of the commodities imported from the French colonies every 
year. As a control, I also used different issues of the Annuaire Statistiques de France reporting 




Not all exports from French Africa went to France. Yet, given the importance of the French 
market, using import prices in France is a good benchmark against which to compare African 
export prices. By 1949, for instance, France was the destination of about 80% of the total 
exports originating from its African colonies (Duignan and Gann 1975). Moreover, as shown in 
section V, extraction estimates are also robust to using world prices. 
 
 Trading Costs  
 
In addition to price data, to estimate competitive prices we need to measure trade costs. They 
include shipping and insurance costs between the African and the French port, and inland 
transport, processing, warehousing, port costs, and export taxes between the producer and the 
African port. For the sake of space, I discuss the procedure I used to estimate each of these costs 
in Online Appendix C. 
 




The price data described in section II are prices at the African port. Yet, we are interested in 
measuring colonial extraction faced by the producers. This gives rise to the following question: 
how can we use the available data on port prices to measure colonial extraction at the producer 
level? To solve this problem, we must first explore what an ideal measure of extraction looks 
like. If we had data on producer prices, we could measure extraction as the percentage gap 
between competitive and actual producer price 
 
                                                                                                                        (1) 
 
where p − t − s is the competitive producer price (computed as difference between price in 
France p and trading costs from the African port to France t and from the producer to the 
African port s) and pA is the actual price paid to the producers. We can interpret this measure 
as how much the producers lost with respect to a situation of free trade. 
How can we estimate equation (1) without information on producer prices pA? The solution 




port. These valuations included in fact the price paid to Africans pA producers together with 
inland trading costs s (processing, inland transport, warehousing and port costs, customs 
duties). It is important to notice that this does not depend on the assumption of competition (or 
lack of extraction) in the internal markets, but just on how values were reported by customs 
offices. The valuations at the port were not the prices paid by the trading company to the 
intermediary at the port, but they were, by law, the sum of official producer prices and inland 
trading costs. 
Several sources confirm this interpretation. Annuaire Statistiques, both from West and 
Equatorial Africa, report that the evaluations at customs offices were valeurs au point de sortie 
(exit point values) or valeurs mercuriales. The latter is defined as the sum of valeur d’achat 
(purchase value) from the producer, transport, and processing costs. These valuations were 
reported in such a way because customs offices were required to record the value of the good 
on which to levy duties (valeur imposable si la merchandise devait aquitter un droit ad valorem). 
In the later colonial period, in particular after WW2, these valuations also included customs 
duties and can be considered as Freight-On-Board (FOB) prices (Annuaire Statistique de l’AEF 
1951-1955, Annuaire Statistique de l’AOF 1949-1951 and 1950-1954). Other sources confirm 
what was reported in the Annuaire Statistiques. For example, Dampierre (1960), describing 
cotton prices in Ubangi-Shari, mentioned how the prix de revient la cote (equivalent to the 
valuation at the exit port) was determined as the sum of the producer price fixed by the 
government, as a percentage of world market prices, and processing and inland transport costs. 
Similarly, Nabe (1999) reported that in Togo within the value at the exit port were included the 
producer price, taxes, and inland trading costs. In addition, direct data on cotton producer 
prices from Ubangi-Shari allows us to test these assumptions and confirm the validity of the 
proposed approach. The results of this analysis are reported in Online Appendix B. 
Given the previous discussion, the price pP   at the African port is equal to pA +s and we can 
thus estimate colonial extraction from known quantities as  
 
                                                                                                                                      (2) 
 
III.2 Historical Background 
 
How did colonial policies affect colonial extraction e as defined in equation (2)? To see this, we 




French West and Equatorial Africa occurred between 1880 and 1900 and at the beginning of 
the 20th century more permanent institutions could be established (Coquery-Vidrovich 1969; 
Suret-Canale 1971). The French government organized the colonies in two federations: French 
West Africa (1895) - including Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan (now Mali), Niger, Upper 
Volta (now Burkina Faso), Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Dahomey (now Benin)—and French 
Equatorial Africa (1908)—including Gabon, Congo, Ubangi-Shari (now Central African 
Republic), and Chad. After WW1, part of Togo and almost all of Cameroon were added to the 
French colonies in continental Sub-Saharan Africa. The extension of French possessions was 
reflected in the heterogeneity of their natural environment, including, from the coast towards 
the interior, tropical forests, savannas, and arid regions. The coastal forestry regions were 
suitable to produce bananas, coffee, cocoa, and rubber, while the drier interior areas were 
suitable for peanuts and cotton. In general, Western colonies were more prosperous than 
Equatorial colonies and, with the exception of the peanut-producing areas of Senegal, coastal 
regions were usually wealthier with respect to interior regions because of the higher value of 
their crops and lower transportation costs (Hopkins 1973). 
Most of colonial economic activity revolved around trade. Exports were mainly based on 
production by African farmers, while European trading companies limited themselves to collect 
crops from Africans at trade posts and resell them at higher prices in Europe. The colonial 
government benefited from this trade by establishing customs duties and by taxing part of the 
companies’ profit (Suret-Canale 1971). Nevertheless, given French Africa’s low population 
densities and abundant cultivable land in the indigenous sector, African incentives to produce 
export crops were very limited. If the trading companies had been to pay free market prices, 
this would have greatly reduced their profit. For these reasons, they lobbied the colonial 
government to establish trade monopsonies and coercive labor market institutions, such as 
compulsory cultivations and various forms of forced labor. Some monopsonies were conceded 
de jure from the colonial government to specific companies, while others came into being de 
facto as a consequence of economic crises and protectionist policies (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1972; 
Manning 1998; Suret-Canale 1971; Thompson 1957). Formal monopsonies were established in 
the Equatorial colonies. Since the early XX century, the French government divided the territory 
of Equatorial Africa among concessionary companies with monopsony power. African laborers 
were forced to collect crops for the concessionaires who employed harsh coercive methods. 
In West Africa, instead, de facto monopsonies became the norm. At the beginning of the 




trading firms, while Guinea was in the hands of business houses from Marseilles or Paris. 
Smaller traders were allowed a share of exports as long as they respected the prices fixed by 
the main trading firms.5 After WW1, the de facto monopsony of these companies grew stronger: 
economic crises eliminated competition from smaller companies, German business interests 
were canceled by the war, and protectionist measures were taken against British trade. 
Protectionist policies were not applied everywhere and did not completely eliminate non-
French trade (especially in Guinea and Dahomey). Nevertheless, the number of the remaining 
trading firms became sufficiently small to allow agreement and ban entry into the African 
market (Suret-Canale 1971). As a result, at the beginning of WW2, about a dozen companies 
monopolized almost all of trade from French West Africa, and two French companies (Société 
Commerciale de l’Ouest Africain, Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale), and one British-
Dutch company (Unilever) controlled between 50% and 90% of exports (Suret-Canale 1971, p. 
167). 
In addition to creating monopsony power for the trading companies, the colonizers 
attempted to reduce prices to Africans by interfering with labor markets and implementing 
coercive institutions. One option was to introduce compulsory cultivations. In this case, quotas 
were set of produce that Africans had to cultivate and sell for a fixed price to the colonizers. 
Moreover, in addition to compulsory cultivations, the colonizers also used indirect methods 
such as poll taxes. Introduced to raise the revenue of colonial governments, they also served 
the function of forcing Africans to produce cash crops in order to earn the money needed to 
fulfill their fiscal obligations. In Equatorial Africa, for example, poll taxes were introduced in 
1902 as a way to facilitate rubber collection for the concessionary companies. 
What was the potential impact of these monopsony and labor coercion policies on 
producer prices? The effect of monopsony is clear: a monopsonistic buyer is able to impose 
lower prices to the seller. The effect of labor coercion and production quotas is a reduction of 
the outside options of Africans. If outside options are limited, African farmers will be forced to 
accept lower prices. 
 
IV Results: Price Gap Estimates 
 
To evaluate systematically how effective colonial policies were in reducing producer prices, we 





IV.1 Main Result 
 
Table I presents the main estimates. The first six columns show means and standard deviations 
of French prices, competitive producer prices, and actual producer prices. Correlations 
between prices in France and at the producer level are also reported. The column labelled 
“extraction” reports mean estimates of e as defined in equation (2) and equivalent to E of 
equation (1) (i.e. extraction as a percentage of competitive counterfactual price) together with 
standard deviations. We can interpret these values as how much lower African prices were with 
respect to what they should have been if trade had been competitive.  
The first row considers the full sample: extraction e, as defined in equation (3), is 0.32. On 
average, prices at the producer were one third less of what they should have been in a 
competitive market, without monopsony and labor coercion. In the following rows, I checked 
whether this result is driven by specific periods, colonies, or commodities. In all samples, 
extraction rates are positive. All periods were subject to some extraction, ranging from 20% to 
50%. Looking at differences across commodities, we notice that extraction was particularly 
large for cotton (39%), while it was lower for palm kernels, peanuts, and cocoa (27-33%). 
Across colonies, average extraction ranged from 28% in Dahomey and Ivory Coast to 74% in 




To evaluate the magnitude of these results, we can estimate the total average annual profit 
extracted by the colonizer between 1900 and 1945 as about 38 million 1914 francs. The total 
GDP of French West and Equatorial Africa in 1925 was about 1965 million 1914 francs 
(elaborations from Cogneau, Dupraz, and Mesplé-Somps 2018). This implies an average annual 
“extraction” of almost 2% of GDP. Considering that the average per capita GDP growth was 
about 1% per year during the same period, the extent of extraction was quite significant. 
The magnitude of these results suggests that it is important to fully consider the role of 
monopsonistic trade when evaluating the costs and benefits of colonization. Huillery (2014) 
finds that the average annual cost of colonization of West Africa (1844-1945), including military 
expenses, administration, and subsidies, was about 15 million 1914 francs per year for 




1945 was about 27 million 1914 francs, showing that the profits from price gaps were such to 
largely pay for the cost of colonization.  
Including the profit from monopsonistic trade also provides us with a more complete 
picture of transfers between the metropole and the colonies. Between 1907 and 1945, France’s 
expenses for subsidies and administration amounted to only 0.47% of French West Africa 
revenue. On the other hand, companies’ profit from colonial trade was equivalent to about one 
third of revenue of West and Equatorial Africa combined (115 million 1914 francs in 1925, 
elaborations from Cogneau, Dupraz, and Mesplé-Somps 2018). Monopsonistic trade accounted 
thus for most of the resources transferred between the colonies and the metropole. 
 
IV.2 Trends over Time 
 
Given the significance of the above results, it is interesting to analyze more in detail the trend 
of price reduction over time. Figure I shows average level of colonial extraction across all 




At the beginning of colonial rule, in 1900, extraction was low at about 20%. In the following 
years, as colonial rule became more established and trade monopsonies got stronger, it appears 
there was a steep rise in extraction, reaching 40-50% in the 1910s. Similar levels persisted 
between the late 1920s and the Great Depression, when the decline of world market prices 
reduced the gap between competitive and actual African producer prices to about 30%. After 
this period, colonial extraction reverted back to its previous levels until the end of WW2. After 
the war, it became more difficult for the colonizers to justify the use of coercive institutions in 
front of the public opinion both in France and in the colonies. Forced labor, for example, was 
abolished in 1946 in the entire French Africa. Compulsory productions in Equatorial Africa 
persisted for a little longer, but were also abolished in 1956. This trend was reflected in a 
reduction of colonial extraction: in the post-war period price gaps declined to about 20%. 
Despite this improvement, at the eve of independence prices to African producers were still 
lower than competitive prices. Even if the colonizers relied less on labor coercion during the 




Was this general trend common to all colonies? Figure II presents the average extraction 




Equatorial colonies (Gabon, Congo, Ubangi-Shari, and since the mid-1920s, Chad and Cameron) 
followed the general trend very closely, with higher average extraction. From low levels in 
1900, extraction quickly rose to almost 60% by 1920. The rapid increase in colonial extraction 
can be linked to the intensifying of the operations of concessionary companies in the French 
Congo at the beginning of the XX century (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972). In the 1920s to early 
1930s, price gaps decreased, consistently with both the abolition of the concession system and 
the 1929 crisis which reduced the profit margin of the trading companies (Suret-Canale, 1971). 
Then, since the late 1930s, extraction increased again to more than 60% during WW2. The 
consolidation of cotton compulsory cultivation in Ubangi-Shari and Chad can partly explain this 
rise (Dampierre 1960).  After WW2, as coercive institutions lost their prominence, colonial 
extraction gradually diminished, reaching 20% at the end of the colonial period. In West Africa, 
the general trend was followed, but variations over time in the level of extraction were less 
pronounced than in Equatorial colonies. Overall, the extraction rate in Western colonies peaked 
at about 50% in the 1910s and then declined, reaching 20% at independence. The lower level 
of extraction in West Africa is consistent with historical accounts of the less prominent use of 
coercion in Western with respect to Equatorial colonies (Manning 1998; Suret-Canale 1971; 
Thompson and Adloff 1957). 
Observing extraction across territories, it is clear that, even if the general trend is common, 
there are important differences in the level and timing of variations. Did similar differences 
exist also across commodities? Figure III shows the evolution of extraction on cocoa, cotton, 




Peanuts were the main exports, accounting for about one third of the value of all trade from 
French West and Equatorial colonies during the period of the analysis. Palm kernels accounted 
for about 15%, while cotton and cocoa accounted for about 5%, respectively. Despite some 




beginning of the period, price gaps rose to almost 40%. Then, after the temporary reduction 
during the Great Depression, extraction rates decreased finally to 20% near independence. 
Cotton, instead, experienced high levels of extraction already at the beginning of the colonial 
period (almost 60%), which decreased to 40% in the 1920s and to 20% in the post-war period. 
 
V  Robustness Checks 
 
The results of section IV show that there existed a large gap between actual and competitive 
producer prices. Yet, to be able to interpret this as evidence of colonial extraction, we need to 
make sure that we have not mismeasured prices or underestimated trading costs. In addition, 
we need to be able to rule out alternative explanations for these price differentials. 
 
V.1 Discussing Alternative Explanations for Price Gaps 
 
Measurement Errors in Prices 
 
Commodity prices might be measured with errors. First, prices are computed as unit values 
(total value divided by total quantity) and can be prone to errors especially in the case of low-
quantity observations. To check the robustness of the results against this type of inaccuracy, I 
tested whether extraction is positive (e > 0) when we exclude price data coming from 
observations with total quantity of 1000 tons or less. Doing so, the sample is reduced to 312 
observations, but e is still positive and statistically significant (average =0.29, st. err. =0.01). 
Second, one might worry that, since exports were taxed on value, the trading companies 
underreported prices in order to reduce taxes. However, this cannot be the case since values 
were registered by customs offices on the basis of prices fixed by the colonial government. Since 
one the objectives of the colonial administrators was to increase the value of trade from the 
colonies, their incentives, if anything, must have been toward reporting higher and not lower 
prices at the African ports. 
 
Measurement Errors in Trade Costs 
 
How sensitive are the extraction estimates to different measures of trade costs? How large 
should trade costs be to cancel out the results? Following equation (2), larger inland trade costs 




extraction estimate. It could be possible that real inland trade cost were actually smaller than 
my estimates, so that the computed extraction would be biased upwards. For example, 
monopsonistic trading companies could have paid very low wages to African porters or used 
coercion in the processing of goods, such as in the ginning of cotton. How sensitive is average 
extraction to reducing inland trade costs? By reducing inland costs by 50%, extraction declines 
to 0.28 from 0.32. Even if we considered an extreme case scenario with s=0, average extraction 
only slightly decreases to 0.25. Varying inland trade costs cannot cancel out the results.  
What about shipping and insurance costs t?  The impact of an increase in shipping costs 
depends on the relative size of t and s. If the estimates of s were correct, we would need to 
increase t by 400% to eliminate extraction. If instead the actual value of s were zero, we would 
need to increase shipping and insurance costs by over 250%. This exercise suggests that the 
extraction estimates are not very sensitive to the specific trade cost estimates. Extraction 
remains positive even allowing for a 100% reduction in inland trade costs and a simultaneous 
250% increase in shipping and insurance costs. 
 
French Prices and World Prices 
 
One might wonder about the comparability between French and world market prices. 
Historians have in fact claimed that the French firms enjoyed prices lower than world prices for 
raw materials from the colonies (Amin 1973; Emmanuel 1973). Following this reasoning, it 
could be argued then that prices in France net of trading costs would not be a good 
counterfactual for African prices in the absence of colonial extraction. Nevertheless, if this is the 
case, the results of this paper are actually even stronger. If French prices were lower than world 
prices, then the gap between African and French prices is actually a lower bound of the gap 
between African and world prices. 
To see how close French prices are to world prices, I estimated world prices in the 
following way. First, by using data from FAO (2016), I computed import unit-values in 1961 for 
each of the commodities, by averaging unit-values from all importing countries. Unit-values are 
directly comparable to my data on French port prices. In addition, by averaging across all 
countries we get a better estimate of world prices than if we just compared French prices to 
prices of other specific countries, such as the UK or the US. I then used the index of world price 
variation from Jacks (2013) to estimate world prices in every year from 1898 to 1959. As 




Figure IV reports the estimates of extraction over time, computed by using world instead 




As anticipated, the extraction rate is even larger, ranging from 40% to almost 80%. With the 
exception of the initial period, the trend is also similar to the one in figure I, computing 




Given the nature of historical records, some data are missing. This would be a problem if 
somehow French prices were reported only when particularly high and African prices were 
reported only when particularly low. In this case, we would observe price gaps that are due to 
the non-random missing data. This seems, however, very unlikely. In general, data are missing 
because statistical publications disappeared or were too damaged to be consulted in the 
archives. For these reasons, it is plausible that the data will be missing due to random historical 
circumstances.  
To check this, I tested whether specific colonies, commodities, or periods are particularly 
prone to missing data. For each colony and commodity, I considered all those observations for 
which we do not have information in years after the first year of recorded production as 
missing. To see whether data are missing at random, I regressed a dummy equal to one if data 
are missing and zero otherwise on 13 colony, 4 commodity, and 5 decade fixed effects (probit 
model). The idea here was to check whether missing data are correlated with observable and 
unobservable determinants of colonial extraction, proxied by the set of fixed effects. Despite 
the flexible functional form and the large set of independent variables, the adjusted pseudo-R2 
of the regression is very low (14%), which supports the hypothesis that missing data are not 




One might argue that we observe price gaps just because prices in Africa did not respond 




transmission of price information and inefficient arbitrage which characterized early twentieth 
century trade. In particular, if, because of these market rigidities, African prices would tend to 
remain low when world prices increased, we would observe positive gaps between African and 
French prices, which could not be attributed to colonial extraction. 
To address this concern, consider that if pA = p − t − s at time 0 (no extraction) and African 
prices are “sticky”, gaps at time 1 should be positive when the world price net of trading costs 
increases, but negative when the world price net of trading costs decreases. Thus, if we limit 
our analysis to years in which world prices net of trading costs decrease and we still find 
positive gaps, we can be confident that this is not due to market rigidities, but instead to colonial 
policies. In effect, when we reduce the sample to just those observations for which the 
competitive price at time 1 is lower than at time 0, the average price gap is still positive (29%) 
and statistically significant (N=261). 
 
Insurance of African Producers 
 
In the case of British colonies, trade monopsonies had the de jure aim to insure African 
producers against fluctuations of world market prices through the mechanism of marketing 
boards. Farmers had to sell their production to the government and were paid less than world 
prices when prices were high. The difference was collected by the marketing board and was 
used, in theory, to pay higher prices to farmers whenever world prices were low. Similar 
institutions were established in French Africa with the name of caisses de stabilisation. We could 
then think that the observed gap between prices in Africa and France might actually be an 
“insurance premium” which Africans had to pay in order to stabilize commodity prices. 
This interpretation however is not likely. First, marketing boards did not fully reach their 
objective of insuring producers and soon became a way to transfer resources from farmers to 
urban sectors of the society in order to gain political support (Bates 1981). Moreover, 
marketing boards and caisses de stabilisation were established only late in the colonial period 
(since 1940 in British Africa and since 1954 in French Africa; Nabe 1999) and cannot explain 










Since prices to producers were fixed by the colonial government as a percentage of an average 
world price computed across different qualities (see Dampierre 1960, for cotton), we do not 
need to worry about observing different grades of the same crop in Africa with respect to 
France. Nevertheless, one might think that we observe gaps just because the quality of African 
commodities was lower than the average world quality. However, this is unlikely: African 
commodities are often of higher quality or they are the most common variety, so that African 
quality determines world quality. For example, the quality of African cotton, characterized by 
longer fibers, is higher than average (Basset 2005, cited in Moseley and Gray 2008); while the 
forastero cocoa cultivated in Africa, despite being of lower quality than the criollo and trinitario 
varieties, represents the greatest majority of world cocoa production (today, about 85%). 
Additional evidence comes from comparing extraction rates between commodities of 
different quality. If the gaps between African and world prices were due to quality differences 
(instead that to colonial extraction), we should expect larger gaps for commodities of lower 
quality. African cocoa was likely of lower quality, while African cotton was of higher quality, 
relatively to the world average. Yet, average extraction was 32% for cocoa and 39% for cotton 
(see table I). Finally, given their magnitude, quality differences cannot explain price gaps. 
Variations in quality can account for up to 15-35% of the difference in port prices within one 
commodity (Persson 2004). Since trading costs account for about one third the price difference 
between African and French port (see table II), even if we assumed the largest quality 




Investments in Africa 
 
Even if it is now clear the described price gaps do exist, one might still be skeptical about 
interpreting them as evidence of extraction. In particular, one might argue that price 
differentials were used for colonial investments in public goods (transports, education, and 
health) that would benefit African populations.  A closer look to colonial budgets show, 
however, that this could not be the case. First, such investments were mostly covered by local 




differentials. Huillery (2014) provides relevant information on French West Africa. Colonial 
public investments included education, health, infrastructure, and support to productive 
sectors. Investments in health and education were extremely low: in an average year between 
1907 and 1956 there were about 1,000 teachers and 1,400 doctors covering a population 
ranging from 12 to 25 million. Support to productive sectors was equally low while investments 
for infrastructure represented the majority of public investments. Before WW2, investments in 
infrastructure amounted to about 25 million 1914 francs per year, on average. The profits from 
price differentials from West Africa in the same period amounted at about 27 million per year. 
Even if the colonizers had used only price differentials to fund public investments, which is 
extremely unlikely, they would have still made a significant profit. 
 
Direct Evidence on Companies’ Profitability 
 
The presence of large price gaps suggests that French trading companies in Africa were very 
profitable. Additional evidence from companies’ dividend yields and profit margins confirm 
this hypothesis. In Equatorial Africa, the ten most successful companies in the French Congo 
accumulated 10 million francs in net profits in just seven years of activity from 1900 to 1906, 
equivalent to more than 7% of the total value of imports and exports (Suret-Canale 1971, p.38-
39). In West Africa, the dividend yield of the Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale, one 
of the major companies of the region, was 9% in 1897-1899 (Société d’études coloniales de 
Belgique 1902, note 205-206), never dropped below 20% between 1912 and 1915 (Anell and 
Nygren 1980, p. 81), and reached more than 26% in 1916-1920 (Union Coloniale Française 
1922, note 100). In 1945-1946, exporters of peanuts from Senegal enjoyed profits of 8.5% net 
of all trade costs, and net profits were even higher on imports, ranging from 20% to over 40% 
depending on the produce (Suret-Canale 1971, p. 184-185).  
As a comparison, the average interest rate on government bond in Europe in the same 
period was 3-5% (Anell and Nygren 1980, p. 81). British firms’ return on invested capital was 
5.2% between 1919 and 1963 (average of 10-years rolling return, Duignan and Gann 1975, p. 
675-676) and the dividend yield of US companies in the S&P500 was 3.7 % in 1897-1899, 5.4% 
in 1912-1915, and 6.8% in 1916-1920 (Shiller 2015). Profit margins of French trading 
companies in Africa were comparable to those obtained by highly successful monopolistic 
colonial ventures, such as the Royal Niger Company, whose dividend yield was 7.5% in 1897-




yielded less than 11% (Anell and Nygren 1980, p. 81).  Moreover, they also were similar to those 
obtained in one of the most profitable industries in Africa: mining. South-African gold mines 
returned 9% on invested capital between 1887 and 1965, while mines in the Belgian Congo 
returned 7.9% between 1920 and 1939 (Duignan and Gann 1975, p. 675-676). 
 
V.2 Taking into Account Unobservable Costs: A Regression Approach 
 
The previous section ruled out several alternative explanations for price gaps. The observed 
differences between actual and competitive producer prices cannot be explained neither by 
measurement errors or missing data, nor by observable trading costs and relatively observable 
factors such as quality differences, market frictions, insurance of producers, or colonial 
investments. Yet, there might be other unobservable costs which could explain the difference 
between African and French prices. Since trade in Africa was risky, companies might have paid 
lower prices as a compensation against world price volatility or production shocks within 
Africa. Low producer prices could have been necessary to compensate for the cost of building 
trade posts and maintaining trade routes. There might have also been other unobservable 
transaction costs related to adulteration, spoilage during shipping, and bulking. Finally, 
productivity differences might also contribute to explain price gaps. 
Unfortunately, all these costs are very difficult to measure. The evidence suggests however 
that they were not as important as we might think. As discussed at the beginning of section V.1 
(Measurement Errors in Trade Costs), extraction remains positive even allowing for a 400% 
increase in shipping and insurance costs. If price gaps were due to unobservable costs, these 




Yet, to be able to construct precise estimates of extraction, we need to take these costs into 
account explicitly. To solve this problem, let us rewrite the definition of extraction E from 
equation (1) as  
 





To estimate extraction E, I regress the actual producer price pA on the competitive producer 
price p − t − s 
 pAcit = α + β (pct − tcit − scit) + ucit                                 (4) 
 
where β=1-E,  c identifies the commodity, i the colony, t the year, and ucit is the error term. To 
run this regression, I estimated producer prices pA (which are not directly observable) as the 
difference between port prices pP and inland trade costs s. Under the null hypothesis of no 
colonial extraction (E=0), β=1; otherwise, with colonial extraction (E>0), β <1.  The average 
level of extraction can thus be measured as 1 − β. If we have a consistent estimator of β, then 
we have a measure of colonial extraction. 
However, the estimation of β could be inconsistent if trade costs t and s do not include all 
of the costs that the trading companies had to face to export commodities from Africa to France. 
To see why, suppose that the true regression is pAcit = β (pct − tcit − scit − ccit) + vcit, where ccit  
represents unobservable costs and vcit is the new error term. Assume 
Cov(p,v)=Cov(t,v)=Çov(s,v)=0. Standard results imply that, estimating β by OLS from equation 
(4), plim βOLS = β [ 1- ( Cov(p,c)-Cov(t,c)-Cov(s,c) ) / Var(p-t-s) ]. Thus, if Cov (p,c) − Cov(t,c) − 
Cov(s,c) > 0, then the estimated coefficient would be biased against the null hypothesis of no 
extraction.  
Even if it is reasonable to think that the correlation between unobservable costs c and 
observable costs t and s is positive (implying a likely bias in favor of the null), the correlation 
between prices in France and omitted costs could also be positive, leaving the direction of the 
bias ambiguous. To reduce the impact of unobservable factors, I pursued two strategies. First, I 
controlled for unobservable costs by using fixed effects. Second, I used world prices as an 
instrument for competitive producer prices. 
 
Fixed effects 
I modeled unobservable costs as ccit = kci + θt. The first component k captures the differences in 
unobservable costs due to each commodity-colony; the second component θ captures the 
variation over time, common to all commodities-colonies. This is a mild assumption: I allowed 
unobservable costs to vary across commodity-colony and time, just assuming a common trend 
over time in all colonies and commodities. In the empirical specification, I implemented this 
idea by including commodity/colony and time fixed effects in equation (4). In this way, the 




variation within each commodity/colony over time, after taking into account common time-
shocks affecting all commodities and all colonies. 
 
Instrumental variables 
Another strategy to consistently estimate β is to use instrumental variables. The IV approach is 
particularly useful to take into account those unobservable factors, such as business risk, which 
might change at a different rate over time across the different colonies and commodities. These 
type of unobservable factors are unlikely to be taken into account by year and 
colony/commodity fixed effects. Yet, if we find a variable which is correlated with the 
competitive price and uncorrelated with unobservable trade costs, then we can use it as an 
instrument to produce consistent estimates of the coefficient β. 
The index of world prices by Jacks (2013) could serve as an instrument for competitive 
prices. World prices are obviously related to African competitive prices, but are not likely to be 
affected by unobservable costs between each French African colony and France. This is because 
French Africa only accounted for a minimal proportion of total world exports. In the late 1940s, 
for example, peanuts from Senegal, the main peanuts producer of French Africa, accounted for 
just 2% of world exports, while cocoa from Ivory Coast, the main cocoa producer, and palm 
kernels from Cameroon, the main palm kernels producer, accounted for only 4%. Cotton from 
Chad, its main producer, reached 0.2% of total world exports only after independence. In the 
earlier years of the colonial period, these shares were even lower. In general, variations in 
world prices are likely to be exogenous since they are due to shocks in world supply and 




Tables III reports the results. To control for differences in inflation, both competitive and actual 




In the first column, a simple regression is presented: the coefficient of the relationship is less 
than one and statistically significant. A one-franc increase in the competitive producer price 




In column (2), I accounted for commodity-specific differences in inflation. Instead of 
deflating prices by inflation rates, I controlled for commodity-specific price deflators by 
interacting the inflation rates in France and French Africa with commodity dummies. In 
columns (3) and (4), I controlled for differences in productivity, proxied by the total quantity 
exported and indexes of soil suitability. These indexes are constructed by FAO (2016) by 
dividing each country in a set of 5x5 km squares and estimating total potential production per 
hectare in each of these squares for each commodity. My measure of productivity is the average 
of these values for each colony and commodity, computed with GIS. In all specifications, the 
coefficient of interest is statistically lower than one, suggesting that the hypothesis of colonial 
extraction is robust to differences in inflation across commodities and differences in 
productivity across colonies/commodities. 
In column (5), I used fixed effects to control for unobservable factors such as trade risk, 
uncertainty, and difficult-to-estimate transaction costs. I included both colony/commodity and 
year fixed effects. The coefficient of the competitive price is still lower than one. Even within 
the same colony and commodity, taken into account unobservable costs common to all 
observations in a given year, an increase in the competitive price is reflected in a less-than- 
proportional increase in the price that African producers received. In addition, it is interesting 
to notice that the coefficient with fixed effects is actually lower than the one from the simple 
OLS estimates. This suggest that unobservable costs are likely to bias the coefficient towards 
one and it is consistent with the fact that observable and unobservable costs tend to be 
correlated. 
In column (6), I applied the other strategy to control for unobservable cost, by 
instrumenting the competitive price with the world price index. Colony/commodity and year 
fixed effects were also included. The first stage, reported in the bottom three rows of the table, 
shows that, as expected, world prices are positively correlated with competitive producer 
prices in Africa. Controlling by fixed effects, the relation is strong as shown by the large F-
statistics. In the second stage, the coefficient of the competitive prices is much smaller than one. 
According to the estimates, actual producer prices were on average only half of what they 
should have been in a competitive market. In addition, notice that the coefficient from the last 
specification, which includes both instrumental variables and fixed effects, is not statistically 
different from the coefficient of the simple regression (column 1). This suggests that 
unobservable costs play at most only a minor role and gives us some more confidence that the 






Extractive colonial institutions are considered one of the main causes of current African 
underdevelopment (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Nunn 2007). Yet, since colonial 
extraction is hard to quantify and its precise mechanisms are not well understood, a paucity of 
research has examined exactly how successful the colonizers were in extracting wealth from 
Africans. 
In this paper, I sought to address this research gap by exploiting the peculiar structure of 
monopsonistic trade and coercive labor policies employed by the French colonizers. By using a 
newly collected dataset of export prices and trade costs, I constructed yearly estimates of 
extraction at the colony/commodity level for almost the entire colonial period, as proxied by 
the gap between actual prices to Africans and prices in a counterfactual competitive world. The 
findings of this research suggest that African prices were substantially lower than world market 
prices and that this difference cannot be explained by observables trading costs or other 
unobservable factors. According to the estimates, African producers would have enjoyed prices 
almost double if the colonizers had not employed extractive institutions. 
Having quantified the extent of extraction through trade during the colonial period, the 
next step is to understand the details of the impact of colonial trade monopsonies and coercive 
institutions on current economic development. The level of extraction, in fact, varied greatly 
across colonies and commodities and this variation can help explaining the different paths of 
growth in African countries and regions. Moreover, the extractive character of these specific 
institutions persisted in the post-colonial era. Coercive labor institutions were abolished by 
independence, but trade monopsonies continued and post-independence governments kept 
practicing price policies, such as market boards and price control, which discriminated against 
agricultural producers. Given our clearer understanding of extraction during colonialism, 
future research aimed at examining how institutions established in colonial times still affect 















1 Extractive institutions can be defined as those arrangements “designed to extract incomes and wealth 
from one subset of society [masses, African populations] to benefit a different subset [elite, colonizers]” 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Specific examples from colonial times include forced labor and land 
alienation policies, monopolistic trade arrangements, and high levels of taxation combined with little 
provision of public goods. 
 
2 Previous works by economists often exploited spatial variation in some colonial policy or institution, 
observed at one point in time.  Huillery (2009) studied the impact of colonial investments in education 
in French Africa. Gallego and Woodbery (2010) and Nunn (2010) analyzed the effect of colonial 
missionary activity on schooling and religious conversion. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) 
estimated the effect of arbitrary colonial borders on civil war.  Berger (2009) studied the modern impact 
of colonial policies on public good provision in Nigeria. Notable exceptions are Cogneau and Moradi 
(2012)’s analysis of colonial policies across the border between French and British Togo, Huillery 
(2014)’s study of the costs of colonization for France, Frankema (2011)’s work on public finance in the 
British colonies, and Frankema and Van Waijenburg (2012)’s analysis of real wages in colonial Africa. 
 
3 Trade monopsonies as a mechanism of rent extraction were first emphasized by Bates (1981) in his 
analysis of marketing boards in British Africa. 
 
4 This result can be related to the finding by Yeats (1990), who shows that even in the postcolonial period 
the former French colonies paid, for import from France, prices which were 20-30% higher than world 
market prices.  
 
5 The fact that smaller trading firms were able to operate show that the monopsonies which appeared in 
West Africa resulted more from a political plan to prevent entry in the market than from a market 
structure with high fixed costs. 
 
6 The reason why the trend in 1900-1920 is different than in figure I is that, in some periods, French 
prices diverged from world prices. From 1900 to 1920 world prices were declining, while French prices 
were constant. For this reason, the extraction rate computed from world prices was decreasing, while 
the extraction rate computed from French prices was increasing. 
 
7 Data on the French inflation come from France-Inflation.com (2013). African inflation is estimated as 
explained in Online Appendix C 
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Colonial Extraction over Time (French prices) 
The figure shows the trend (local mean smoothing) of colonial extraction, defined as one minus the ratio 
between actual and competitive price at the producer level (see equation 2). All colonies and 
commodities are pooled together. The shaded area represents a 95% confidence interval around the 
extraction estimates. See Online Appendix C for information on sources of price and trade costs data used 














1 Figures are produced by using the plotplain Stata code, developed by Bischof (2016), “New Figure 









Colonial Extraction over Time, in West and Equatorial Africa (French prices) 
The figure shows the trend (local mean smoothing) of colonial extraction, defined as one minus the ratio 
between actual and competitive price at the producer level (see equation 2), in Equatorial and West 
French colonies.  See Online Appendix C for information on sources of prices and trade costs data used 




















Colonial Extraction over Time, by Commodity (French Prices) 
The figure shows the trend (local mean smoothing) of colonial extraction, defined as one minus the ratio 
between actual and competitive price at the producer level (see equation 2). Graphs are presented 
separately by commodity. The shaded area represents a 95% confidence interval around the extraction 
estimates. See Online Appendix C for information on sources of prices and trade costs data used in the 






















Colonial Extraction over Time (World Prices) 
The figure shows the trend (local mean smoothing) of colonial extraction, defined as one minus the ratio 
between actual and competitive price at the producer level (see equation 2). Competitive prices are 
computed from world prices. All colonies and commodities are pooled together. The shaded area 
represents a 95% confidence interval around the extraction estimates. See Online Appendix C for 










 producer price 
actual  
producer price correlation  extraction N 
  mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.   mean st. dev.  
Overall 39.80 88.20 28.76 65.31 22.82 55.19 0.95 0.32 0.21 448 
By period:           
pre-WW1 1.18 0.76 0.93 0.66 0.63 0.50 0.84 0.29 0.17 26 
1914-1929 5.06 3.98 3.83 2.97 2.21 1.83 0.78 0.39 0.22 178 
1930s 2.57 1.81 1.80 1.32 1.27 0.90 0.88 0.28 0.16 122 
WW2 6.19 3.15 4.68 2.63 2.23 1.51 0.62 0.50 0.22 23 
post-WW2 166.10 121.46 119.72 93.27 97.02 82.12 0.90 0.20 0.15 99 
By commodity:            
cocoa 52.98 113.14 46.41 99.89 38.80 86.96 0.99 0.32 0.18 113 
cotton 75.21 127.17 44.25 74.61 33.87 60.68 0.97 0.39 0.22 96 
palm kernels 20.31 31.10 15.81 24.95 12.59 20.26 0.95 0.27 0.18 146 
peanuts 17.84 37.07 11.67 25.54 8.05 17.80 0.93 0.33 0.23 93 
By colony:           
Cameroon 28.37 86.48 22.78 74.06 18.78 66.09 0.96 0.34 0.21 57 
Chad 171.22 150.51 68.73 66.77 45.16 45.98 0.97 0.39 0.21 6 
Congo 58.55 89.74 45.49 77.17 39.16 72.30 0.97 0.34 0.23 26 
Dahomey 42.63 90.16 30.12 59.29 24.99 50.22 0.99 0.28 0.19 60 
Gabon 55.73 117.15 47.08 103.41 37.87 87.46 0.99 0.41 0.24 40 
Guinea 15.17 36.04 11.94 30.36 8.89 22.60 1.00 0.29 0.17 44 
Haute-Volta 200.87 121.04 139.03 78.21 98.46 56.14 0.95 0.30 0.16 4 
Ivory Coast 51.83 96.35 39.75 73.15 31.69 61.59 0.98 0.28 0.16 71 
Niger 91.73 14.02 40.56 11.59 22.90 3.72 1.00 0.40 0.18 3 
Senegal 15.06 43.03 12.77 37.24 9.71 30.35 1.00 0.31 0.19 56 
Soudan 6.90 4.96 4.23 3.36 1.45 1.84 0.78 0.74 0.23 9 
Togo 9.61 33.66 7.21 23.56 4.92 15.55 0.99 0.29 0.18 61 
Ubangi-Shari 178.19 147.91 98.44 75.64 80.71 62.42 0.98 0.19 0.21 11 
Correlations between French port price and actual producer prices are reported. The column of labeled “extraction” report mean estimates of “e”, as defined in equation 
(2) and equivalent to “E” of equation (1) (i.e. extraction as a percentage of competitive counterfactual price). See Online Appendix C for information on sources of prices 






Prices in Africa, Trading Costs, and Prices in France 
 
variable mean st. dev. min max average % 
of price at 
French 
port 
producer price 22.82 55.19 0.0032 346.60 50% 
total trading costs 11.70 30.24 0.0892 205.99 28% 
processing 4.55 19.18 0.0000 123.98 5% 
inland transport 2.85 8.07 0.0038   64.14 10% 
port 0.32 0.75 0.0013     3.58 1% 
export taxes 1.97 6.41 0.0000 43.74 1% 
insurance 0.40 0.88 0.0044     4.21 1% 
shipping 1.60 2.89 0.0308 13.79 10% 
price at French port 39.80 88.20 0.2200 421.12 100% 
Values per kg in current French francs. Trading costs include both cost between the producer 
and the African port and costs from the African port to the French port. N=448. See Online 




































Relationship between Competitive and Actual Producer Price 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS /Second Stage: dependent variable is the actual producer price 
 
competitive price, deflated 0.602*** 
 
0.600*** 0.599*** 0.352*** 0.523*** 
 (0.088)  (0.090) (0.085) (0.120) (0.154) 
competitive price  0.682*** 
(0.099) 
    
quantity (in 000s tons)   -0.000159 
(0.000251) 
   
cotton productivity    -0.169 
(2.230) 
  
cocoa productivity    0.203 
(0.400) 
  

















N 448 448 448 448 448 448 
R2 0.50 0.98 0.50 0.51 0.83 0.821 
Fixed Effects       
Commodity   yes     
French inflation*commodity   yes     
African inflation*commodity  yes     
commodity*colony      yes yes 
year      yes yes 
       
First Stage: dependent variable is the competitive producer price 
world price index      1.310*** 
      (0.172) 
F-stat IV      57.87*** 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level with standard error clustered at 
the colony/commodity level (number of clusters=40). In the fixed effect regressions of columns (5) and 
(6), constants are not reported. Sources: see Online Appendix C and section V2. 
